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MIND AND BRAIN IN TIIE l 7TH CENTURY 
Jonathan Bennett 
1 .  Can matter think? 
Descartes bequeathed to his successors what he and they thought to be a sharp, deep split 
between the mental and the material. He thought it was a split becween things, with every 
thing belonging to one of the two kinds and no thing belonging to both. According to 
him, a human being is a pair, a duo, a mind and a bcxiy; or, more strictly, a human being 
is a mind that is tightly related to an animal body. The exact nature of that relation was 
one of the problems that Descartes never solved to his own satisfaction, let alone to 
anyone else's. 
Not all of those who took over the split thought that it was a split through things. It 
was possible to hold - as I am sometimes inclined to - that material properties are 
radically different from mental properties, neither being reducible to the other, and yet 
there are single things, not pairs or duos or small committees, that have properties of both 
kinds. In the language of the 1 7th century, that is the belief that matter can think, i.e. that 
an item that bumps and shoves its way through space can also be the subject of thoughts 
and experiences and perceptions. 
In that century an impressive amount of intdlecrual energy went into debating 
whether matter could think. rm going to pick out of that debate certain strands that I 
hope are still of interest today. They certainly interest me. Such understanding as I have 
of the philosophy of mind - I mean of what is actually true about mentality, not merely 
of the history of men's opinions about it - has come from tracking some of the 1 7th 
cent11ry writers as they beat their way through the undergrowth. I don't mean that they 
eventually led me to true conclusions, which I gratefully swallowed. They got most things 
wrong, I believe; but there is a lot to be learned from working out where they were wrong 
and why. 
2. Descartes' reasons 
Why ,did Descartes hold that his mind was one thing and his body another? His most 
interesting argument for this goes as follows. 
He held that any portion of matter has parts, smaller bits that are related to one 
another so as to constitute the bigger portion. Even if we don't accept that for all matter, 
it certainly holds for the best candidates for the title of "thinking matter", namely animal 
bodies or brains. Any one of those is a lot of smaller things interrelated in cenain ways. 
But, Descartes said, his mind was not an aggregate of pans. It had different faculties or 
capacities, of course: memory, perception, reason, and so on; but these are just different 
qJ4alities of a single mind, he said, not parts of it. They are comparable with the animal's 
ability to walk and to eat and to digest, not with its legs and its head and its guts. So, he 
concluded, his mind could not be a material thing, since all of those do have parts. And 
he was willing, I don't fully grasp why, to draw conclusions about minds in general from 
premises about his own mind in particular. 
Why was Descartes so sure that his own mind was not an aggregate of parts? Well, he 
thought that any mind was fundamentally open to inspection by its owner: indeed he 
drew the line between what is mental and what isn't Largely in terms of what can be known 
by introspection and what can't; and he thought he could just see that his mind was 2
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ultimately single and not an aggregate. This puzzled me for many years, until at last I read 
Kant's Critique of Pu're Reason and found an explanation. Kane conjectures chat Descanes 
was sure that his mmd was not made up of parts because he couldn't make sense of che 
idea of introspectively seeing or sensing his mind as an aggregate of pans. Nor can I or 
anyone else male sense of this, for the reason that Kane gives: in any sue h seeing or 
sensing there has to be oneself, one's whole unexamined and undivided mind, tO perform 
the mental act in question. 
Bue I also agree with Kant that chis is just a limitation on how we can directly 
experience our minds, not on what our minds can actually be like. 
About twenty years ago this came to be strihngly illustrated by facts about the mental 
functioning of people in whom lx>th cerebral hemispheres are working properly except 
that the direct neural connections between them have been surgically cut. As is now 
widely known, such people get through most of ordinary life with no ttouble, buc 
situations can be contrived in which their loss shows up: for example, they are asked to 
do with the left hand some task that requires information possessed only by the 
hemisphere controlling the right hand; the left hand fumbles, and the right hand tries to 
help it out. Phenomena like these invite us to see all normal people as having minds with 
parts or subdeparonents, and co see these special folk being different only in that in them 
there is some breakdown in communication between the parts. I'm not insisting that that 
is right; merely saying that it is plausible, and gets some support from the data. But all of 
that suppon comes from oddities in the behavior of the people; one of them might, on 
being informed about his behavior, come to the same conclusion himself; but it seems not 
to make sense to suppose that someone could reach that conclusion about himself -
namely that his mind is a collaborating set of sub,.·minds - purely on inner evidence, an 
introspective perception of the different sub--deparonents communicating with one 
another. That, ina nutshell, is Kant's lesson: I cannot directlyperceive mymind as having 
parts, but it may have parts for all that. 
This bit of worlc of Kant's is fine, and true; it explains what lay behind Descartes' 
argument, and explains why it is not sound. 
Descartes had another argument - more famous, but worse - for the conclusion that 
minds and bodies don't overlap. It was a peculiar thought-experiment that seems to have 
convinced nobody else. When about a dozen of his contemporaries sent him written 
comments on his masterpiece the Meditations (he had asked them to), almost all of them 
took aim at this thought - experiment argument, and he didn't defend it well. I don't 
intend to spend time on it, except to report that it too illegitimately draws conclusions 
about what your mind is like from premises alx>ut how it seems introspectively to you. 
3. Locke's agnosticism 
Let's move across the British channel and down history half a century: we come to John 
Locke, who was vastly influenced by Descartes in all sorts of ways, including caking over 
his split between thought - properties and matter - properties. He wasn't tempted by 
either of Descartes' arguments for the view that bodies cannot think; and in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, when hammering home his views alx>ut how little we 
do or can le.now, he cites the question of whether matter ever thinks as a prime example 
of a large, central question to which we shall probably never know the answer. 
This agnosticism is easy co understand. Locke had a picture of reality as consisting of 
things with properties; and he took over from Descartes the division of properties into two 
sorts, pertaining to mind and matter respectively, with no logical commerce between the 3
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cwo- no implications from one to the other and no inconsistencies between chem either. 
So. he thoughc, there is nothing that makes it absolutely impossible that matter should 
chink. and nothing making it ab.solutely necessary that whatever thinks should be 
macerial. For maner to think is just for a thing to have a bunch of properties of one kind 
and a further bunch of a quite unrelated kind. The question "Does any matter think?", 
according to his view of it, is not like the question ... Are any cannibals carnivorous?" or 
"Are any cannibals vegetarians?" - each of which can be answered jusc by thinking about 
ir - but rather like the question " Are any cannibals short,sighted?" 
So, just by thinking about what conceivably could or couldn't be the case, we shall get 
nowhere, Locke thinks. It is not absolutely impossible - it's not logical11 impossible - for 
there co be thinking matter; but it could be that there is none, for it is not absolucely 
necessary that whatever thinks should be material. His next step is to conclude that if we 
can't settle the question in that way, we can't settle it at all. Each human being has a 
physical and a mental aspect, says Locke, and this could come about in either of two ways: 
either God has "given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and 
chink", 1 in which case some matter thinks; or God has "joined and fixed co matter so 
disposed a thinking immaterial substances", in which case no material systems think for 
themselves, but some are linked with immaterial substances that do the thinking. And 
we can't possibly choose between these, Locke says, because there can't be any empirical 
content to the idea of a portion of matter that thinks. For him there is no way the evidence 
could let us choose between "This portion of matter thinks .. and "This portion of mace er 
is associated with an immaterial substance that thinks". In his own words: "We know not 
co what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give the power of thinking, 
which can be in any created thing only by the good pleasure and bounty of the creacor. "2 
4. Leibniz's opposition 
Leibniz read Locke's Essay with some admiring approval and a larger measure of dismay 
and condescension. He wrote a long French , language commentary on it, the New Essays 
on Human Understanding, which has the form of a dialogue between himself and Locke. 
In this dialogue, each time Locke expresses himself as agnostic about whether matter 
thinks, Leibniz comes down on him like a ton of bricks. He agrees that thinking matter 
is not absolutely impossible -it is not like a vegetarian cannibal. But he doesn't agree that 
there is nothing more we can do to discover whether any matter does think. When Locke 
sets up his alternative ways for God to associate thought with an animal body-by letting 
it think, or by inserting into it an immaterial substance that thinks - he implies that it 
is for God to choose arbitrarily which alternative to adopt. Locke does frequently credit 
God with arbitrary choices - picking A rather than B at whim, so to speak, and not 
becat1se A is better or more reasonable or natural than B - and he sometimes expresses 
that arbitrariness idea by speaking of "the good pleasure of the creator". 
Leibniz pounces on this angrily: this "good pleasure of the creator", he sayst is neither 
good nor pleasure; the implication that God might act without a reason is impious, and 
is also objectionable at an even deeper level. Leibniz is a rationalist in the sense that he 
thinks there is a reason for everything - there is a satisfactory answer to every "Why"? -
question - and this basic commitment to reasonedness, to there being no absolutely brute 
facts, requires that God always acts for a reason and never arbitrarily. 
I remark in passing that in this sense of "rationalist", Descartes was not a rationalist 
though he is standardly classified as one. He said that good thing:s are good because God 
wants them, and that it limits God's power to suppose that there are standards of 4
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goodness thac are independent of his will. Leibn12 says that God wants good things 
because they are good, and that Descartes' vtew lIIlphes that there is no concenc co the 
statement that God is good -it merely means that he wants what he wants. More radically 
still, Descartes said that absolutely necessary truths - such as that 2 + 1 = 3 - are made 
true by God, and that it would be a limiting of God's power to say that he could not have 
made it the �  that 2 + 1 = something other than 3. You can guess what Leibniz 
thought about that! He said that Descanes' God is no God at all, because he is neither 
good nor re.a.son.able, since each of those virtues consist in conformity to independent 
standards of virtue and rationality. 
I wish that Leibniz's rationalism were right but I'm sure that it can't be. I want there 
to be no absolutely brute facts - no cases of ""That's the way the cookie crumbles" wich 
nothing more to be said about it - but I'm afraid that unexplained brute factuality can't 
be avoided. It may be good for our intellectual health never co accept that we have 
reached a rock - bottom inexplicable fact, and always to insist on looking for explana. 
tions. But even if each pankular fact can be explained - for example by saying that it was 
caused by some antecedent fact, and so on backwards to infinity - it makes sense to think 
of the entire (perhaps infinite) sequence of things and events, past, presenl( and future, 
and to aslc why it is actual rather than some other entire series. The answer can't come 
from inside the series, because such an answer would be a part of the question; and it can 'c 
come from outside the series because there is nothing outside the series. So there is no 
answer. 
Leibniz thinh otherwise, however. He thinks he can answer the big "Why?" -
question that I have just aslced - Why is this world the actual one? - but I shan't discuss 
chat. All that matters now is just that he does hold onto his rationalism, and is led by it 
to conclude that whatever God does is unarbitrary, is inherently reasonable, so that the 
question of why he acts as he does always admits of a satisfying answer, even if we don't 
always know what it is. 
With that doctrine up his sleeve, Leibniz look.s at the alternatives that Locke says are 
open to God making animal bodies think for themselves and adjoining to them 
immaterial substances that do the thinking for them - and he judges that one is more 
reasonable than the other, and is therefore the one we should believe God to have 
adopted. I quote from him: 
Whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that 
if we understood the nature of both the subject and the quality we 
would conceive how the quality could arise from it. So within the order 
of nature (miracles apart) it is not at God's arbitrary discretion to 
attach this or that quality haphazardly to substances. He will never 
give them any that are not natural to them, that is, that cannot arise 
from their nature in an explainable way.3 
So a reasonable God won't let any material object think unless its thinking arises 
naturally from its material nature. 
Although I don1t accept Leibniz's rejection ofbruce facts, it is doing good service for 
us here by putting wind into the sails of the question of whether matter thinks, rescuing 
it from the becalmed agnosticism in which Locke had left it. Locke was right that the 
question in his fonn of it couldn't possibly be answered, but now we have something we 
can get our teeth into: Could there be a material system - a brain, for instance - whose 
physical workings were sufficient to explain all the states and activities of a mind? 5
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Leibniz, as you will have guessed, answered No. He regards it as Mcertain that thought 
can't be explained in terms of matter", and goes on to develop this poinc of view: 
A sentient or thinking being is not a mechanical thing like a watch or 
a mill: one can't conceive of sizes and shapes and motions combining 
mechanically to produce something that thinks, and senses too, in a 
mass where formerly there was nothing of the kind. So sense and 
thought are not natural to matter, and there are only two ways in 
which they could occur in it: through God's combining matter with a 
substance to which thought is natural, or 1through his putting thought 
into it by a miracle.4 
He is thinking of a miracle as something arbitrary, and therefore bad and not to be 
believed in, though it is not absolutely impossible. Locke, as we shall see, agreed with 
Leibniz that matter could not naturally produce thought; where they part company is in 
their different attitudes to miracles, that is, to irregularity, brute factuality, arbitrariness. 
Leibniz often says that maner could not produce thought. Here is how he puts it in 
his work the "Monadology": 
Perception . . .  cannot be explained on mechanical principles, i.e. by 
shapes and movements. If we pretend that there is a machine whose 
structure makes it think. sense, and have perception, then we can 
conceive it enlarged, but keeping to the same proportions, so that we 
might go inside it as into a mill. Suppose that we do: then if we inspect 
the interior we shall find there nothing but parts that push one 
another t and never anything that would explain a perception. Thus 
perception must be sought in simple substances, not in what is 
composite or in machines. s 
This was evidently a favorite line of thought of Leibniz's, but it is not very good, for at least 
two reasons. 
Firstly, it pretends to know what kinds of operations occur at the submicroscopic level 
in organisms - that that level contains "nothing but parts that push one another". This 
is shut,minded in two different ways. It supposes that 17th century physicists knew that 
at the macroscopic level the main outlines of physics were permanently fixed - it's a 
matter of "mechanical principles, i.e. shapes and movements", and that's it. It also 
supposes - and indeed Leibniz says outright - that "we know that there is no essential 
difference between large and small bodies, but only a difference of magnitude 11• As he puts 
it in one place: 
Material particles, however small they might be, could not be com, 
bined or modified so as to produce perception; seeing that large 
particles could not do so (as is obvious). and that in small particles 
everything is proportional to what can happen in large ones.6 
This assumption that the very small differs from the large anly in being smaller wasn't 
special to Leibniz. It was been described by C.D. Broad as a blank check that all scientists 6
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wrote on the bank ofNatuTe; there weren't enough funds co cover it, and ic was jusc good 
luclc that the checlc didn't visibly bounce until the 19th cenrury. 
Still, although everyone else was guilty of it too, I do hold against Leibniz this shut -
minded attitude to the future of physics - this dogmatic confidence that research would 
never tak.c physics far beyond the bounds of impact mechanics, whether on the Large scale 
or the small Leibniz was in many ways gloriously open - minded, but not about this. 
Even at that time there was reason to think that bodies can not only push but also 
attract one another. That may not help us to understand how matter could produce 
thought, but is at least a warning against wearing blinkers. Locke is an interesting case. 
He wrote that he used to think that all physical action occurred through impact "until 
Mr. Newton wrote his incomparable book", which convened him to a belief in 
gravitational attraction. Loclce promised to amend accordingly the subsequent editions 
of his Essa,, but he mostly didn't. He fiddled with almost every sentence in the later 
editions, and yet we still find him saying, for example, that "impulse" is "the only way we 
can conceive that bodies operate in".7 Evidently, the blinkers were hard to get rid of. 
The second defect in Leibniz's "mill" argument is chis. Even supposing chat the basic 
properties and powers of matter are just the ones acknowledged by impact mechanics, 
Leibniz hasn't shown that they could not produce thought- Remember that he is not 
demanding that all a thing's qualities be absolutely necessitated by its basic nature, but 
just that they relate to it in an intelligible, non-arbiaary fashion. He will allow ic to be a 
contingent, God - ordained truth that things with nature N also have property P, so long 
as God has a good reason for Basing N on P rather than on Q; there muse be something 
about N and P that malces them fitting for one another. That is all that Leibniz is 
demanding. Now, is it so utterly obvious that no physical N (with this understood in terms 
of shapes, sizes, motions etc.) could have thar relation co any mental P? Leibniz 
apparently did find it obvious, or thought it could be made obvious by the thought -
experiment of the "mill"; and I hold that against him. It is not obvious; it needs to be 
supported by argument; and he doesn't supply any. 
6. Locke's God argument 
On this point, Locke did better. I have remarked that he held as Leibniz did that matter 
could not produce thought; he would have agreed with Leibniz about the mill. But where 
Leibniz merely says that his view is "obvious", Lodce provides an argument. It is deeper 
and more interesting than Leibniz's thought about the "mill", as well as being less 
dogmatic and blinkered. In it, Locke argues that any thought worthy of the name must 
exhibit patterns that have no analogues in the behavior of unaided material systems, so 
that such systems could not be the cause of mentality. 
The argument is mentioned in passing in one of the main discussions of thinking 
matter in the Essay. Locke asks whether matter could, unaided, produce thought, and 
answers emphatically that it could not: matter could think, but only if there were already 
a thinking being that enabled it to do so. In a world lacbng mentality, he says, mentality 
couldn't come into existence purely through a change in the physical arrangements. His 
argument for this occurs in a chapter where he is trying to show that there is a God and 
to find out what he is like. Having proved to his own satisfaction that there has from all 
eternity been a thirWng being, which is the source of all other thought in the universe, 
he then considers whether that being could be material. He takes t.his a step at a time. 
Could God be a single atom? No. Could God be something more complex than an atom, 
but not owe His thoughts to that extra complexity? No, that would be like God's being 
7
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3 more decorative atom. What remains is the possibility that God is a complex material 
system which thinks because of its complexity of physical structure and operation. 
This is the hypothesis that the universe contains thought because, and only because, 
there is a material system whose structure and mode of operation cause it to be a thinking 
thing. The structure is purely physical, and the mode of operation must be purely 
mechanistic, with nothing happening in it because of the intentions of any designer or 
guardian. We are considering the God who is the source of all mentality in the universe: 
any designers or guardians must result from the workings of the material system we are 
now discussing, and cannot help the system to work in the first place. 
Even if you don't much care whether God could be a system of matter, you may have 
reason to attend to Locke's argument. His question of whether God (the source of all 
thought) could think as a result of the movement of his parts is all of a piece with the 
question of whether thought could arise naturally, explicably 1 in a godless physical world. Either way, it's the question of whether unaided matter- matter that is not miraculously 
interfered with from the outside - could produce thought. 
Here is Locke's case for saying that thought could not enter the universe in that way: 
If it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends, all the 
thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited; since all 
the particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself 
without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be 
regulated by the thought of the whole, since that thought is not the 
cause of the motion but the consequence of it. [And so} freedom, 
power, choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite 
taken away. So that such a thinking being will be no beitter nor wiser 
than pure blind matter; since to resolve all into the accidental 
unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on 
unguided motions of blind matter, is the same thing.8 
I admire this beautiful argument. Going much deeper than Leibniz's mill, it does not 
assume that 17th century impact mechanics must be the final truth in physics, or that the 
laws governing the very small must be the same as those governing the large. Let us now 
see h.ow it does work. 
The argument can be seen as saying that 
There is some kind of regularity or orderliness such that: ( 1 )  no 
movements of bits of matter can have it unless they are already under 
the guidance of thought, (2) something that lacks it cannot cause 
something that has it, and (3) thought that is worthy of the name must 
have it. 
I have put this in the form "There is some kind of regularity . .. 11 because if the argument 
is stated in terms of"regularity" as such, it becomes fatuously wrong. For then it implies 
that the movements of particles that are not guided by thought must be a mere chaotic 
jumble. We know better than that, and so did Locke. He can't have forgotten that in a 
pendulum clock, for instance, there are orderly, regular, patterned movements that 
result purely from an underlying physical structure of the right kind. 
What, then, was he talking about? He might say: "My topic is a certain very high degree 
of ordered complexity that is required for thought, properly so called. The behavior of a 8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol25/iss1/2
88 Jonathan Benneu 
pendulum clocK. though adrructedly regular, is roo simple to tllusrrace whac I am talking 
about." Bue r.hat would be a risky line co cah. I! a simply structured dock can exhibu 
simple patterns of behavior, why �hould not more complex patterns - up to any level of 
complexicyyou like -be achieved by physical things whose struccures were more complex 
in che righc ways? 
Someone mighc come to the rescue of this vers:ion of the argument by contending that 
nothing could get che right kind of ordered complexicy of physical structure unless some 
thinker had designed it. In pre,Darwiruan days this was a popular contention, often used 
to argue that some designer must have made the plants and :animals. But when Locke 
ma"-es such a point in another part of the Essay, he doe� so by asking 
Whether it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters 
should often fall into an order which should stamp on a paper a 
coherent discourse, or that a blind fortuitous concourse of atoms, not 
guided by an understanding agent, should frequently constitute the 
bodies of any species of animals.9 
He answers of course that anybody with his wits about him will know straight off that 
these are utterly improbable. The wording seems to have been carefully chosen: without 
thinking auchors it is not "probable" that coherent prose should "often" get writcen; 
without help from a designer it is not "probable" that animals should "frequently" come 
into existence. Locke is rightly not saying that a fortuitous concourse of atoms could never 
come to constitute the body of a pig or of a human being; it's merely unlikely to happen 
often. 
His God argument, on the ocher hand, is about whecher something is possible just 
once, not whether it is probable as a common occurrence. So the two have nothing to 
do with one another, and we still don't know how the God argument is supposed to work. 
7. Mechanism and teleology 
Faced with chis point about the orderliness of the behavior of a pendulum clock, Locke 
would reply that the clodc's movements are wrong not in degree or amount of ordered 
complexicy but racher in kind. The lcind he has in mind is, I believe, the le.ind teleological 
- that is, the order manifested by a system in which things happen so that other things 
may happen, or where an event can be explained by reference to what it is for or what 
it leads co. 
So the argument runs as follows. Mentality essentially involves teleology: the mind 
reaches out to possible futures, leading people to do things so as to bring about various 
upshots, thus endowing them with "freedom, power, choice"; the teleological nature of 
mind is che source of the possibility of"rational and wise thinking [and] acting,,. Further, 
there cannot be anything goal,oriented about the "accidental unguided motions of blind 
matter,,, that is, the movements of matter chat is not guided by thoughts. Therefore no 
such movements could be a sufficient cause for mentality. 
In that statement of the argument I have thrown in some phrases of Locke's that 
suggest that he was thinking of teleology. The most potent word is "blind": the unguided 
motions of particles are blind because the particles go where they are pushed, without 
reference to what the upshot of that will be; whereas (according to Locke, if I understand 
him aright) che mental movements that we call "thought" essentially involve foresight, 
looking ahead, doing things because of what they will lead to. From now on, I shall assume 9
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chat ] am right in thinking that teleology is at the heart of Locke's argument. 
The argument is val.id, and I think its first premise is true. As I have argued in a book 
I wrote twenty years ago, the best way to get mentalistic concepts rooted in the world is 
through teleology: we ground mentality in theories saying that animals do things because 
they think they will lead to certain upshots. 10 And this has to be accepted by anybody 
who thinks, as do most philosophers of mind tcxlay. chac an understanding of the mind 
must put at its center the concepts of belief and desire, and that neither of these makes 
sense except in the context of a theory that also treats of the other. That commits them 
co tying mind to teleology, because desire is essential to mind and tis a teleological notion. 
But I do not accept the second premise of Locke's argument: although a lot of work 
remains to be done on this, it can hardly be doubted today that some behavior that can 
be explained in purely mechanistic, non-teleological terms- explained in terms of what 
causes the behavior - can also be explained in terms of what the behavior is for, that is, 
explained teleologically. The dog digs in the ground so as to get 'the bone, or because it 
thinks that's the way to get the bone; but it is also true that each movement that the dog 
makes is caused, pushed from behind, explainable purely in terms of neural impulses and 
the Like. Of course it isn't enough just to assen this; one needs some account of how it 
can happen that both sons of explanation can validly be given for the very same events. 
Many contemporary philosophers seem to take it for granted that this can be done 
somehow, without going into the details of how. A fairly detailed account of how is given 
in the book of mine that I mentioned earlier. 
8. Enter Spinoza 
One more journey through space and time: 1 want to jump back across the channel once 
more , this time to Holland, and to go back about twenty years. This brings us to Spinoza 
working on his E�s. This book contains not only ethics but also metaphysics and 
philosophy of mind. It is a strange, recalcitrant, remote work - a creaking apparatus of 
elaborate "demonstrations", supposed to be like those of Euclid's geometry but nearly all 
of them invalid; it is full of technical terms that are either unexplained or given 
explanations that cry out for explanation in their tum; but it also contains passages of 
connected prose that are some of the most memorable and provocative in the whole 
literature of philosophy. 
Altogether, Spinoza's Ethics gives the effect of standing at an astronomical distance 
from the rest of philosophy; and it is true that many of those who have attended to 
Spinoza's work have taken an attitude to it that is religious rather than philosophical -
an attitude that leads them to object to one's trying to get clear about what Spinoza was 
saying so as to argue with him about it. But some of it can be got clear, and is deep and 
interesting. Furthermore, as I shall now argue, some of Spinoza's philosophy of mind 
belongs to a diffe·rent intellectual world from that of Descartes, Leibniz and Locke 
because it belongs rather to our world - the thought forms that are dominant in the late 
twentieth century. 
Spinoza holds that every mental state or event is strictly paralleled by a physical state 
or event. He doesn't say that the mental is caused by the physical, because of a special 
view of his about what it takes for a relation to be a "causal" one. But he holds that 
between brains and minds there is an absolutely dependable regular mau:h -you can't get 
any change into someone's thinlking without making a corresponding change in his brain, 
and on the other hand if a brain of a certain kind comes into existence it will dependably 
and naturally be associated with a mind. I stress "naturally": Spinoza will have no truck 10
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with divine intervention, not because he thinks (like Leibniz) it would be bad for God 
to interfere with r.he natural order, hue because he holds chat there is no God outside the 
natural order. 
So there it is. Spinoza holds that anything a mind can do is strictly modelled (and in 
a serue accounced for) by things that physical systems can do. 11tls flatly rules out Locke's 
view that there is something about mental behavior thac cannoc be matched by the 
random movements of blind particles; and it brings Spinoza closer to currents of thought 
in the late 20th century than any of the other philosophers I have mentioned. 
Western thought would have developed faster if Spinoza's real philosophy had 
received more attention. As things were, it was left to Wittgenstein in the fu-st half of our 
century to warn clearly against regarding minds as ... Well, I'll let Wittgenstein speak for 
himself: 
Understanding, meaning, interpreting, thi!Wng ... seem to take place 
in a queer kind of mediu� the mind; and the mechanism of the mind, 
the narure of which., it seems, we don't quite understand, can bring 
about effects which no material mechanism could. Thus for example 
a thought (which is such a mental process) can agree or disagree with 
reality; 1 am able to think of a man who isn't present; I am able to 
imagine him, "mean him" in a remark which I make about him, even 
if he is thousands of miles away or dead. 1 1  
And a little later� discussing what gives a word meaning, bringing the marlcs on the page 
to life, he attacks the idea that this is done by associating the word with a mental image: 
If the meaning of the sign is an image built up in our minds when we 
see or hear the sign, then let us [try] replacing this mental image by 
some outward object, for example a painted or modelled image. Then 
why should the written sign plus this painted image be alive if the 
written sign alone was dead? -In fact, as soon as you think of 
replacing the mental image by a painted one, and as soon as the image 
thereby loses its occult character, it ceases to seem to impart any life 
to the sentence at all. (le was in fact just the occult character of the 
mental process which you needed for your purposes.) 
This is one of the great passages in modem philosophy, in my opinion. It would be hard 
to exaggerate the cleansing power of the idea that one is tempted to tolerate inexplicable 
mysteries - falsehood, referring to what is absent, conferring meaning on a dead sign -
regarding them as tolerable because they occur in the mind, and that one way of fighting 
this temptation is never to credit minds with any power that one couldn't also attribute 
to OOdies. 
The sad thing is that Spinoza had all this three centuries earlier. His doctrine of the 
parallelism between mental and material committed him -and he knew it - to holding 
that there are no patterns of behavior in the life of the mind that are not also present in 
some parts of the physical world. But this doctrine of his didn't catch on. In fact, virtually 
all of Spinoza's contributions to teclmical philosophy have been pretty much ignored: he 
has been attended to more by worshipers at his shrine than by philosophers, more by 
solemn people than by serious ones. This is partly his own fault: his special mixture of 
strengths and weaknesses, virtues and vices, illuminations and fogs, made it likely that 
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Bur there is also a special reason why his refusal to regard the mind as occult didn't 
do much good. Suppose there is something you have taken to be a fact about the mind. 
and then. when you consider it in the light of warnings by Spinoza or Wittgenstein, you 
come to feel that there is something spooky, occult, inexplicable about it. What are you 
going to do? There are two choices: one is co worry away at it until you have understood 
it, caken away ics occult character; the ocher is to deny that it is a face after all. Spinoza 
tended co take the latter alternative. 
For example, he said that there is no such thing as a downright false belief, and that 
all so--called error is really a sort of ignorance; and his ground for this seems to have been 
that he did not see how a real, unrnysterious bit of the narural world could be false. It was 
wonderful that he saw enough to ask the question "How can a natural object be false?0, 
but he gave the wrong answer to it. 
Another example of the same tendency - and this brings me back to my main theme 
-was chat instead oflooking for teleology in the world of matter he denied that there was 
any teleology in nature at all. He rightly saw a teleological explanation as one in which 
an event is explained by reference to a later event: She put baic on the hook in order that 
the fish should bite it. The biting comes after the baiting, and yet it is supposed to explain 
it; chis, said Spinoza, turns nature upside down, and treats effects as though they were 
causes. It can't be right, he concluded; and so teleology is a myth - there isn 'I! any of it 
anywhere. I applaud his not saying "Well, there is celeology in che mind", and leaving ic 
ac that, on the assumption char the mind is a queer kind of medium, where spooky and 
occult things can happen. But it's a pity thac he didn't fight his way through to 
underscanding how celeology can be legitimate, and doesn't really tum nature upside 
down. His accempt to avoid using any such teleological notion as that of purpose terribly 
dis tons his whole account of human motivation, and must have contributed a good deal 
co his not being taken as seriously as he deserved. 
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